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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

State Department review completed

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
Israel: The cabinet is divided over occupied territories policy.

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# Possible Israeli Intentions in Occupied Territories



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ISRAEL: FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN'S RETURN HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY INVOLVE DIFFICULT CABINET DISCUSSION ON ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES.

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DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ALLON TOLD US OFFICIALS ON 22 OCTOBER THAT ISRAEL HAD IN MIND "SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES" IN ITS BORDERS WHICH WOULD ENABLE IT TO STOP ANY FUTURE INVASIONS "ON THE GROUND."

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HE SAID THIS WOULD REQUIRE ADOPTION OF HIS OWN "ALLON PLAN" FOR THE WEST BANK AND SOME ADJUSTMENTS IN SINAI, INCLUDING A STRIP FROM ELAT TO SHARM ASH-SHAYKH.

THE PLAN, WHICH HE FIRST OUTLINED PUBLICLY LAST MAY, ENVISAGES THE ANNEXATION OF THE JORDAN VALLEY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT THERE OF A STRING OF PARAMILITARY AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENTS FROM BET SHE'AN TO JERICHO. THE REST OF THE WEST BANK--EXCEPT FOR JERUSALEM AND AREAS AROUND HEBRON AND LATRUN--WOULD BE OPEN TO NEGOTIATION WITH THE ARABS AND COULD BECOME EITHER AUTONOMOUS OR A PART OF JORDAN CONNECTED WITH THE EAST BANK VIA A CORRIDOR.

ALLON SAID THAT A CABINET MAJORITY FOR A FIRM PROPOSAL TO THE ARABS ON "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED" BOUNDARIES COULD NOT BE OBTAINED WITHOUT HIS SUPPORT, AND THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANYTHING LESS THAN HIS OWN PLAN. HE SAID ALSO THAT THE SINE QUA NON FOR SUCH A CABINET DECISION WOULD BE ASSURANCES OF US "AFFIRMATIVE SUPPORT."

THE ALLON PLAN IS NOT KNOWN TO HAVE GENERAL GOVERNMENTAL APPROVAL, ALTHOUGH ALLON CLAIMED TO THE US EMBASSY OFFICIALS THAT PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL AND FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN WERE "PERSONALLY" IN AGREEMENT WITH IT AND THAT MINISTER OF DEFENSE DAYAN "WOULD GO ALONG." ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE CABINET IS DIVIDED ON THE TERRITORIES ISSUE, AND THAT ARRIVING AT A DECISION--IF THE CABINET IS READY TO MAKE A DEFINITIVE DECISION NOW--WILL BE DIFFICULT, AND MAY SHAKE THE GOVERNING COALITION.

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